Author Archives: Michael Schneider

About Michael Schneider

Sovereign Bond Markets, Market Microstructure

Schneider, M. and Lillo, F. (2016) Cross-Impact and No-Dynamic-Arbitrage


We extend the “No-dynamic-arbitrage and market impact”-framework of Jim Gatheral [Quantitative Finance, 10(7): 749-759 (2010)] to the multidimensional case where trading in one asset has a cross-impact on the price of other assets. From the condition of absence of dynamical arbitrage we derive theoretical limits for the size and form of cross-impact that can be directly verified on data. For bounded decay kernels we find that cross-impact must be an odd and linear function of trading intensity and cross-impact from asset i to asset j must be equal to the one from j to i. To test these constraints we estimate cross-impact among sovereign bonds traded on the electronic platform MOT. While we find significant violations of the above symmetry condition of cross-impact, we show that these are not arbitrageable with simple strategies because of the presence of the bid-ask spread.

Schneider, M., Lillo, F., and Pelizzon, L. (2016) How Has Sovereign Bond Market Liquidity Changed? – An Illiquidity Spillover Analysis. SAFE Working Paper No. 151


Amid increasing regulation, structural changes of the market and Quantitative Easing as well as extremely low yields, concerns about the market liquidity of the Eurozone sovereign debt markets have been raised. We aim to quantify illiquidity risks, especially such related to liquidity dry-ups, and illiquidity spillover across maturities by examining the reaction to illiquidity shocks at high frequencies in two ways:
a) the regular response to shocks using a variance decomposition and,
b) the response to shocks in the extremes by detecting illiquidity shocks and modeling those as ultivariate Hawkes processes.
We find that:
a) market liquidity is more fragile and less predictable when an asset is very illiquid and,
b) the response to shocks in the extremes is structurally different from the regular response.
In 2015 long-term bonds are less liquid and the medium-term bonds are liquid, although we observe that in the extremes the medium-term bonds are increasingly driven by illiquidity spillover from the long-term titles.